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Ι. A conceptual study
The question concerning the existence of moral conscience
1 cannot be 
examined thoroughly in a brief article. Only manifestations of this 
significant problem can be presented. According to ancient philosophers 
the problem of moral conscience concerns human existence. Namely, we are 
1 Jacques Dupont, “Syneidesis: Aux origines de la notion chrétienne de conscience morale,” 
Studia Hellenistica 5 (1948): 119-153; James Hastings, Encyclopaideia of Religions and Ethics 
(Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1926).
The Concept of Moral 
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Abstract
The concept of consciousness in ancient Greek philosophy, concerns the internal 
autonomy and philosophical freedom from the condemnation of ignorance of both the 
foreign and the domestic world. The ancient Greek philosophers pointed out the value 
of the dialectic with the inner self to the problem of moral conscience and handed us a 
legacy of values and the primacy of reason. The article examines the concept of moral 
consciousness in ancient Greek philosophy. The purpose of the article is to investigate the 
moral question related to whether moral concepts have a subjective or an objective basis. 
In addition, the article demonstrates the unaffected by time significance of the concept of 
moral consciousness, as well as its connection with the reality of moral concepts, moral 
propositions, moral judgments, moral man, moral law, moral idealism, moral naturalism 
and moral relativism. Moral consciousness is the mirror of our self-knowledge.
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our moral conscience.2 However, the logical question emerges: what is moral 
conscience? Does it exist by itself or is it a synthesis of mental phenomena, 
cognitive definitions and unconscious qualities? The only thing we can state with 
certainty is that the matter of moral conscience is associated with the problems 
regarding the existence of the soul and ethics.
The term syneidesis (συνείδησις) derives from the verb synoida (Lat. conscio, 
conscientia), a compound word of the verb oida (eidenai) which means immediate 
knowledge as opposed to acquiring knowledge through reasoning (noein). The 
term syneidesis is not found in ancient Greek philosophers. What we find is 
the verb synoida. From the analysis that follows it arises that the existence of 
moral conscience in ancient Greek philosophy concerns the inner potentiality 
and awareness of man to distinguish good from evil. Moral conscience (Fr. 
conscience morale, Ger. Gewissen, Gr. syneidese) is defined as a phenomenon 
or as immediate motion,3 logical meaning, critical ability, action,4 composite 
cognitive function,5 and self-awareness.6 Conscience has a psychological7 and 
an ethical meaning.8 Moral conscience is the complement of psychological 
consciousness9 and is regarded as a distinction among human actions.10
II. Moral conscience in Homer and Hesiod
The question of moral conscience in both Homer and Hesiod is connected with 
the questions of the divine, of the soul and of fate. Homer in his epic poems 
portrays the everlasting battle between good and evil, namely the morally 
opposite definitions of life; through them emerges the need for the existence 
of a divine principle, which may distinguish good from evil: that is moral 
conscience.11 Moral conscience in Homer is presented as the fear of avoiding the 
2 Heinrich Fries, “Gewissen,” in Handbuch der Theologischen Grundbegriffe I, 519-528 
(München: Kösel Verlag, 1966). 
3 Paul Foulquié, Dictionnaire de la langue philosophique (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 
1969), 124-125.
4 Régis Jolivet, Traité de philosophie, vol. IV (Lyon, and Paris: Em. Vitte, 1959), 190-195.
5 Gabriel Madinier, La conscience morale (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1958), 3-9. 
6 Régis Jolivet, Vocabulaire de philosophie (Lyon, and Paris: Em. Vitte, 1962), 43.
7 Jolivet, Traité, 668-670. 
8 Madinier, 14-23 (on empirical ethics). 
9 Maurice Pradines, Traité de Psychologie générale (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 
1946), 6-31; René Le Senne, Introduction à la philosophie (Paris: Presses Universitaires de 
France, 1958), 265-281; Henri Delacroix, Les grandes formes de la vie mentale (Paris: Presses 
Universitaires de France, 1948), 10-55; Madinier, 38-41. 
10 Ferdinand Alquié, Leçons de philosophie II (Paris: H. Didier, 1965), 194-289.
11 Proclus, Platonic Theology Ι5; see DK 1 B 1-23; Cf. Orphicorum Fragmenta, ed. Otto 
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wrath of the eternal gods,12 as the distinction and performance of good action, 
and has the triptych Hubris – Nemesis – Erinyes as a point of reference. Homer, 
without being a fatalist, respects fate, which does not guide man’s will, but only 
motivates it.13
In Hesiod, moral conscience is personified and appears as the daughter of 
Erebus and Nyx.14 She involves herself in earthly matters,15 nevertheless has 
divine quality, since the gods of the pre-Hellenic religious sense were many and 
earthly. Moral conscience is directly associated with respect, order, modesty 
and punishment, since at the pre-ethical stage there is not an established 
ethical system.16 According to Hesiod moral conscience is related to the 
Erinyes,17 who are connected with divine punishment against human hybris.18 
Hesiod gives a metaphysical sense19 to the meaning of moral conscience which 
motivates human action.20
III. The pre-Socratic examination of moral conscience
According to Κ. Popper, the philosophical investigations of the pre-Socratics 
were gnoseological and cosmological.21 Objections to the aforementioned 
position were advanced, supporting the existence of ethical teachings in 
pre-Socratic philosophy. Our research has pointed out that according to 
pre-Socratic philosophers there are traces of teachings concerning moral 
conscience in the Pythagoreans and in Heraclitus. The first literary use of 
syneidesis is found only in Democritus and Chrysippus,22 who do not use the 
Ferdinand Georg Kern (Berlin: Weidmann, 1922). 
12 Homer, Odyssey, 22, 39.
13 Ibid., 1, 32-34.
14 Hesiod, Theogony, 223; Károly Kerényi, Die Mythologie der Griechen (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 
1997), 22.
15 Walter F. Otto, Die Götter Griechenlands (Frankfurt am Μain: Vittorio Klostermann, 1970), 
22-58.
16 Hesiod, Works and Days, 198.
17 Hesiod, Theogony, 185.
18 Jean-Pierre Vernant, Mythe et religion en Grèce ancienne (Paris: Éditions de Seuil, 1990); 
Walter Burkert, Structure and History in Greek Mythology and Ritual (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1979); R. Buxton, Oxford Readings in Greek Religion (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000), 45-78.
19 Egon Friedell, Kulturgeschichte Griechenlands (München: C. H. Beck, 1972), 40-61.
20 Martin P. Nilsson, A History of Greek Religion (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1949), 105-133.
21 Κarl Popper, The World of Parmenides: Essays on the Presocratic Enlightenment (London, and 
New York: Routledge, 1998), 7-8.
22 Diogenis Laertius, Vitae Philosophorum, 7:85. 
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term with a moral meaning,23 while the theory concerning moral conscience 
is largely found in Sophists, especially in Gorgias.24
The cardinal principle of the pre-Socratic philosophers’ thought 
concerning moral conscience does not diverge from their monism-pantheism 
doctrine: “everything is full of gods,”25 in that it gives a divine origin to moral 
conscience. According to W. Jaeger, the moral conscience doctrine of the pre-
Socratics originates from their teachings concerning the infinitude of being.26 
To wit, the range of human moralities is as wide as being is infinite. Jaeger 
high lights the existence of individual morality, proclaims the contemporary 
theory of the death of morality and rejects the concept of social morality, 
which does not exist.
The Pythagoreans focus on the concepts of man’s self-awareness, 
purification, and intellectual completion through numbers27 and the likeness 
to the divine or daimonion.28 Morality is a determining factor for the soul; 
since everything that gets to be done in the present life forms the fate of the 
soul after the death of the body. The theory regarding Pythagorean ethics 
cannot be conceived independently of action. In addition, morality should be 
23 Don E. Marietta, “Conscience in Greek Stoicism,” Numen 17, no. 3 (1970): 178.
24 Plato, Gorgias, 482e-486d. For a detailed analysis, see Alfred Edward Taylor, Plato: The Man 
and His Work (London: Methuen, 1960), 103-129, esp. 115-118.
25 DK 11 A 22: “ὠιήθη πάντα πλήρη θεῶν εἶναι.”
26 DK 12 B1: “ἀρχὴ… τῶν ὄντων τὸ ἄπειρον.” Cf. DK 12 B 3; Werner Jaeger, The Theology of 
the Early Greek Philosophers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1948), 24-59.
27 The Byzantine scholar Micahel Psellos sheds light on the ethical arithmetic of Pythagoreans, 
i.e. the theory that relates numbers to virtue. Consistent with the theory of numbers that 
govern all creation, the Pythagoreans believed that the forces of the soul were connected 
to numbers. In the words of Psellos, in The Excerpts from Iamblichus’ On Pythagoreanism 
V-VII [in Dominic J. O’Meara, Pythagoras Revived: Mathematics and Philosophy in Late 
Antiquity (Oxford, and New York: Claredon Press, 1989), 218-227, esp. 225]: “If the form of 
virtue is defines by a measures and perfect life, mean and perfect numbers fit natural virtue, 
superabundant and deficient <numbers> <fit> excesses and deficiencies in relation to virtue. And 
one must assign the opposites of what we give to virtue to vice: lack of measure and of 
harmony, the differentiating, the unequal, unlimited, and such-like… And each virtue fits a 
number… And courage as manliness relates too odd number, but as constancy it relates to 
square… Fitting temperance, cause of symmetry, is 9 which is multiplied from the triad, for if all 
square numbers produce equality, those produced from odd numbers are the best for producing 
equality, and of these thhe first is the square from the triad, 9, which comes from two perfect 
numbers, the 3 and 6, according to the first perfect number, the 3, perfected completely and 
as a whole.” See also William Keith Chambers Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, vol. I: 
The Earlier Presocratics and the Pythagoreans (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000]), 
317. Cf. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy 1825-6: Greek 
Philosophy, trans. and ed. Robert F. Brown (Oxford: Claredon Press, 2006), 47: “but, because 
he reduces virtue to number, he consequently fails to arrive at a proper theory about it.”
28 Aristotle, Metaphysics 987a11-28; Diogenis Laertius, 8:48; Peter Gorman, Pythagoras: A 
Life (London, and Boston: Routledge, and Kegan Paul, 1979), 24-56.
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considered as reason and consistency, instead of a set of rules or practices 
aimed at bringing social and economic benefits. Moral conscience concerns the 
distinction between good and evil through self-awareness control29 and study.
Heraclitus in his philosophical doctrine stresses the continuous variability 
of beings,30 the harmony of opposition,31 the cause of synthesis, introspection,32 
and pantheism.33 He conceives moral conscience as the gnoseo-ontological 
condition of thought, reason and being. Reason is innate in man, however this 
doesn’t entail that man uses his reason. For example, one is not born evil, yet 
one may become evil only if he prevents himself from submitting to the power 
of his reason. However, if he submits to his reason, which according to nature 
exists concealed in his inner being34 settling the differences, he identifies with 
the harmony of divine reason and becomes blissful. This is the interpretation 
of the Heraclitan saying “the moral conscience in man is the cause of his 
bliss.”35 When moral conscience is animated by reason, it is governed by the 
highest principle of distinction between good and evil action: 
Heraclitus indeed – and the Stoics agree with this – links our 
own reason with the divine reason, which rules and settles the 
worldly matters. Thanks to the unbreakable sequence, our own 
reason is aware of the logically supposed and with the help of 
senses it announces the future to the loved souls.36 
Therefore, moral conscience to Heraclitus constitutes man’s inerrability to 
distinguish good action from non-good.
Our reference to the pre-Socratic teachings concerning moral conscience 
will be completed with Democritus, who alone mentions the term syneidesis. 
29 Pythagoras, Golden Verses, 40-42: “Μὴ δ’ ὕπνον μαλακοῖσιν ἐπ’ ὄμμασι προσδέξασθαι, πρὶν 
τῶν ἡμερινῶν ἔργων τρὶς ἕκαστον ἐπελθεῖν·πῇ παρέβην; τί δ’ ἔρεξα; τί μοι δέον οὐκ ἐτελέσθη;” 
See Johan C. Thom, The Pythagorean Golden Verses: With Introduction and Commentary 
(Leiden, New York, and Köln: Brill, 1994), 75-77, 101-229.
30 DK 22 A 6: “πάντα χωρεῖ καὶ οὐδὲν μένει.”
31 Aristotle, Physics, 203b7. 
32 DK 22 Β 101: “ἐδιζησάμην ἐμεωυτόν.”
33 DK 22 Β 10: “ἐκ πάντων ἓν καὶ ἐξ ἑνὸς πάντα;” DK 22 B 50: “ἓν πάντα εἶναι.”
34 DK 22 Β 123: “φύσις κρύπτεσθαι φιλεῖ.”
35 DK 22 Β 119: “ἦθος ἀνθρώπῳ δαίμων.”
36 DK 22 A 20: CHALCID. c. 251 p. 284, 10 Wrob. [wahrsch. aus dem Timaios comm. des 
Poseidonios.] H. vero consentientibus Stoicis rationem nostram cum divina ratione conectit 
regente ac moderante mundana: propter inseparabilem comitatum consciam decreti rationabilis 
factam quiescentibus animis ope sensuum futura denuntiare. ex quo fieri, ut adpareant imagines 
ignotorum locorum simulacraque hominum tam viventium quam mortuorum. idemque adserit 
divinationis usum et praemoneri meritos instruentibus divinis potestatibus.
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Although Democritus, accepting gods37 and God,38 is unclear on the question 
on the existence of the divine, he conceives man as a microcosm39 and as 
blissful in the safety of the city. Democritus gives the definition of moral 
conscience: 
Some people, ignorant of the dissolution of man’s mortal 
nature, however aware of their evil actions in life, suffer fears 
and disturbances in their lives, while inventing false myths 
concerning their time after death.40
According to Democritus, moral conscience is linked with the matter 
of knowledge and concerns the self-consciousness of a negative action 
or situation.41 Moral conscience is the cognitive perception of action 
and concerns the awareness that an action is good or evil. Distinguishing 
good from evil action requires self-awareness. However, the existence of 
the presupposition does not bring about the achievement of the desired 
outcome or vice-versa; for example, although obeying the laws of the city 
is presupposed for the individual and social welfare, nevertheless it is not 
accomplished. For Democritus, obeying the laws42 is imposed by the feeling 
of shame and the individual moral conscience, especially guilty conscience, 
which concerns both the individual and social morality. The inner being and 
leading a commensurate life ensure individual happiness and harmonic social 
coexistence.43 
37 Aetius, 4:10, 4; Β 175, Β 234.
38 Aetius, 1:7, 16: “Δημόκριτος νοῦν τὸν θεόν, ἐν πυρὶ σφαιροειδεῖ.”
39 DK 68 B 34: “μικρῶι κόσμωι.” Paul Cartledge, Ray Monk, and Frederic Raphael, Democritus: 
Democritus and Atomistic Politics (London: Phoenix, 1998).
40 DK 68 B 297: “ἔνιοι θνητῆς φύσεως διάλυσιν οὐκ εἰδότες ἄνθρωποι, συνειδήσει δὲ τῆς ἐν τῷ 
βίῳ κακοπραγμοσύνης, τὸν τῆς βιοτῆς χρόνον ἐν ταραχαῖς και φόβοις ταλαιπωρέουσι, ψεύδεα 
περὶ τοῦ μετά τὴν τελευτὴν μυθοπλαστέοντες χρόνου.”
41 DK 68 B 19.
42 Gerhard Jean Daniel Aalders, “The Political Faith of Democritus,” Mnemosyne 4, no. 3 
(1950): 302-313; Joannis R. Paneris, Die Staatsphilosophie Demokrits im Hinblick auf die Lehre 
der älteren Sophisten (PhD diss., University of Wien, 1977); Reimar Müller, “Die Stellung 
Demokrits in der antiken Sozialphilosophie,” in Proceedings of the 1st International Congress 
on Democritus, ed. Linos G. Benakis, 423-434 (Xanthi: Bouloukos, 1984); John F. Procopé, 
“Democritus on Politics and the Care of the Soul,” Classical Quarterly 39, no. 2 (1989): 307-
331. 
43 Ioannis Kalogerakos, “Demokrits Auffassung vom Bürger,” in The Notion of Citizenship in Ancient 
Greek Philosophy, ed. Evangelos Moutsopoulos, and Maria Protopapas-Marneli (Athens: Academy 
of Athens, 2009), 74-101; Ioannis Kalogerakos, Seele und unsterblichkeit. Untersuchungen zur 
Vorsokratik bis Empedokles (Stuttgart, and Leipzig: De Gruyter, 1996); Christopher Charles Whiston 
Taylor, The Atomists Leucippus and Democritus. Fragments. A text and Translation with a Commentary 
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The Sophists are considered to be the main introducers of the theory of 
instinct or otherwise stated “theory of self-preservation;” its main concern 
is to define good on the basis not of arbitrary metaphysical hypotheses, 
but of natural inclinations essentially defining human behaviour. Good and 
Evil are not to be understood metaphysically but rather express respectively 
desire or aversion. According to Sophists, ethics, within the context of social 
life, should be viewed in connection to the natural inclination to serve and 
promote personal interest and, therefore, anything promoting this inclination 
is considered good.
Sophists, therefore, concluded towards a morality that was formed 
situationally, contextually; in this sense, they trusted far more the expression 
of individuality to determine what was to be deemed useful and beneficial 
than some general and invariable rules. They place the existence of moral 
conscience within these roving of personal interest and the personal imposition 
or otherwise stated the theory of self-preservation. They stress that the 
socio-ethical rules change from one time to another and from one society to 
another; according to Gorgias,44 they are instituted not according to nature 
but according to position and that the interest of the powerful prevails. With 
Protagoras45 we go from natural instinct to conventional morality. Protagoras’ 
moral relativism does not bring about the lifting of moral conscience and of 
the value of moral rules, to which we all must adhere.46 What impresses with 
the teachings of moral conscience, especially that of Democritus and the 
Sophists, is the fact that their theories begin to reveal in an undetectable 
way the distinction between good and evil, or the consciousness of action 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999); Rudolf Löbl, Demokrit Texte zu seiner Philosophie. 
Ausgewählt, übersetzt, kommentiert und interpretiert (Amsterdam, and Atlanta: Editions Rodopi, 
1989); William Keith Chambers Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, vol. II: The Presocratic 
Tradition from Parmenides to Democritus (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 
382-507; Horst Steckel, “Demokritos,” in Paully-Wissowas Real-Enzyklopaedie des classischen 
Altentums, Suppl. XII, 192-223 (Stuttgart: J. B. Metzlersche Buchhandlung, 1970); Wolfgang 
Röd, Die Philosophie der Antike 1: Von Thales bis Demokrit (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1988), 192-
211, 251-255; Geoffrey S. Kirk, John E. Raven, und Malcolm Schofield, Die vorsokratischen 
Philosophen. Einführung, Texte und Kommentare (Stuttgart: J. B. Metzler, 1994), 439-472; 
Christof Rapp, Vorsokratiker (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1997), 208-238; Christopher Charles 
Whiston Taylor, “The Atomists,” Routledge History of Philosophy, vol. I: From the Beginning 
to Plato, ed. C. C. W. Taylor, 220-243 (London, and New York: Routledge, 1997); Christopher 
Charles Whiston Taylor, “Die Atomisten,” in Handbuch frühe griechische Philosophie, Von 
Thales bis zu den Sophiste, ed. Antony A. Long (Stuttgart: J. B. Metzler, 2001), 165-186; Jaap 
Mansfeld, Die Vorsokratiker II: Zenon, Empedokles, Anaxagoras, Leukipp, Demokrit (Stuttgart: 
Reclam, 1986); Fritz Jürss, Reinmar Müller, und Ernst G. Schmidt, Griechische Atomisten. Texte 
und Kommentare zum materialistischen Denken der Antike (Leipzig: Reclam, 1988).
44 Plato, Gorgias, 483d.
45 Plato, Protagoras, 323c.
46 Ibid., 326c-d.
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– although Socrates is the one who introduced explicitly the notion of the 
conscious awareness of one’s actions, and corresponding consideration of 
good vs. evil on an individual level, as contrasted with the previous mores of 
tradition and custom defining these as handed down. 47
From what has been stated so far, moral conscience according to pre-
Socratics is innate in man and appears to be “carrying out its mission,” when it 
is animated by reason, mind and being. This reason is common and divine and, 
when it is allowed to be the judge and distributor of morality, man becomes 
blissful.
IV. The meaning of moral conscience according to Plato
Fate would have it that Socrates,48 after transferring his philosophical thought 
from things to man, started searching for the carrier of moral existence in 
man, introducing a consciously49 moral internalism.50 Although he does not 
mention the term moral conscience explicitly, however moral conscience to 
him appears to be an innate property of man, an inner voice, which is called 
daimon or divine.51
Plato who does not mention the term conscience, except for the 
verb synoida with various meanings,52 (perception – consensus – assent – 
clear knowledge –acceptance), gave to moral conscience a transcendent 
expression.53 Plato, the philosopher of ‘beyond essence’54 – a saying concerning 
the quantitative transcendence of the divine in relation to human weights 
and measures and the qualitative distinction between material and immaterial 
– is not released from his utopian orientation; in The Republic he presents 
moral conscience as the divine part of man’s soul,55 which is animated by the 
47 For a thorough study on this subject, see William Keith Chambers Guthrie, Socrates 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), 97-104; Aristotle, Metaphysics, 987b1-4; 
1078b17. 
48 Gregory Vlastos, Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1991), 91-98. 
49 Guthrie, Socrates, 130-142. 
50 Walter Burkert, Greek Religion, trans. John Raffan (London: Blackwell, 1985), 179-181.
51 Plato, Apology, 21b, 31c-d, 40a-b.
52 In Plato’s Laws (742b), Phaedrus (92d), Protagoras (348b) and Sophist (232c) the ‘synoida’ 
has the meaning of awareness, while in Theaetetus (206a), in Apology (21-34 b) and in Res 
Publica (607d) has the meaning of consciousness.
53 Plato, Timaeus, 28c: “τὸν μὲν οὖν ποιητὴν καὶ πατέρα τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς εὑρεῖν τε ἔργον καὶ 
εὑρόντα εἰς πάντας ἀδύνατον λέγειν.”
54 Plato, Res Publica, 509b.
55 Plato, Res Publica, 531c. 
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hypostatic properties of the divine: goodness56 and simplicity.57 So in what 
way is the moral conscience doctrine related to man’s inner being? Since Plato 
considers the body as the cover and tomb of the soul,58 he sanction sinner 
man, who is not deceived by his senses59 and passions, which “contribute to 
the distortion of rational soul from its cohabitation with the body.”60 Ιnnate 
reason resides in inner man, that is the one who lives an inner life.61 The 
result of reason’s function, namely of man’s adherence to the wisdom of the 
rational part of the soul’s prudence, is the right and prudent function of moral 
conscience and the right distinction between good and evil. Moral action 
concerns the next stage, namely it is acquired and requires moral conscience.
We believe that the greatest contribution Plato to the matter of moral 
conscience is its connection with the matter of moral freedom and freedom 
of will.62 The Socratic saying “οὐδείς ἑκών κακός,”63 i.e. no man is voluntarily 
evil, introduced the matter of freedom of will to philosophy and linked it 
directly to the matter of the theory of knowledge64 and ethics. According 
to Socrates, since every wrongdoing is the result of a wrong judgment, the 
offender is not the victim of weak will, but of his mental insufficiency. However, 
the following question emerges: since no man is voluntarily evil, therefore he 
is not free, how do we interpret the existence of moral conscience? What is 
the importance of distinguishing between good and evil, namely having moral 
conscience, when one is not free to choose between the good and evil, which 
he has previously distinguished? More importantly, what is the benefit of the 
existence of moral conscience, which logically precedes will, when action is 
adventitiously heteronymous? That is to say, how is man not voluntarily evil, 
as Plato argues, when he has a moral conscience? Plato’s antinomic view,65 
which presents Socrates as determinist (man is free, knowledge is a virtue, 
and there for evil action is involuntary, because man is ignorant and therefore 
he is not voluntarily evil), raises questions concerning the existence of moral 
56 Plato, Res Publica, 379a seq.
57 Plato, Res Publica, 382e: “ἄρα ὁ θεὸς ἁπλοῦν καὶ ἀληθὲς ἔν τε ἔργῳ καὶ λόγῳ.”
58 Plato, Alciviades, 1, 130c: “ψυχή ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος.” Plato, Cratylus, 400c; Phaedrus, 82e; 
Marcus Aurelius, Meditationes, 4:41; Porfyry, On the life of Plotinus, 1. 
59 Plato, Res Publica, 382a. 
60 Karl Bormann, Platon (Freiburg, and München: Verlag Karl Alber, 2003), 188. 
61 Plato, Res Publica, 492e. 
62 Plato stresses the matter of freedom of will in many dialogues: Timaeus, 86e, Menon, 77b, 
Sophist, 228c, Res Publica, 382a, 413a. 
63 Guthrie, Socrates, 179-196. 
64 Gregory Vlastos, Platonic Studies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), 204-217. 
65 Plato, Timaeus, 44c, Phaedon, 80e, Res Publica, 485a.
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conscience, given that freedom of will presupposes moral conscience. Plato 
appears to be answering the aforementioned antinomy in 379 c-d of The 
Republic and in the passages cited, the rendering of which is summarised by 
the phrase: “man is to be blamed, God is blameless.”66
What we must stress is that the investigation regarding moral conscience 
in Platonic works is an ambitious and difficult task. There cannot biasing 
assumption concerning moral conscience. In the Platonic works everything is 
separated and categorised according to the parts of the soul (rational – spirited 
– desiring) and the virtues (prudence and wisdom – bravery – temperance). In 
social existentialism the moral conscience of the kings differs from the one 
of the guards. Conclusively, in Plato, we have aspects of the matter of moral 
conscience; moral conscience seems to be related to immediate knowledge, 
moral liberty and freedom of will,67 although the Platonic doctrine concerning 
the divine likeness of the soul, does not prove moral liberty; instead, it 
introduces moral determinism, namely lack of moral freedom, since anything 
that is going to happen is in advance hetero-determined and hetero-defined 
to happen as it will happen.68
V. The meaning of moral conscience according to Aristotle
Aristotle does not use the term syneidesis either, except for the verb synoida 
with various meanings (knowledge – awareness – prudence). He replaces the 
66 Plato, Res Publica, 347d, 505d, 617e, 619b, Laws, 719d, 916b, Phaedrus, 230e, 249a, 
Protagoras, 356e, Philebus, 33a, Apology, 37b.
67 Plato, Timaeus, 86e, Menon, 77b, Sophist, 228c, Res Publica, 382a, 413a. Plato puts forth 
the notion that man has full knowledge of his actions, i.e. consciousness, and the intellectual 
capacity to foresee their ramifications, but seems to have been hazy on the connection between 
moral responsibility and bad acts. Plato aligns the Good with knowledge and the Bad with 
ignorance, but somewhat overlooks the complexities inherent in the latter state, whereby an 
agent can truthfully skirt responsibility for an evil act, thus attaining absolution and disrupting 
the equilibrium of justice. 
68 Aristotle was opposed to the view held by Socrates and Plato that man’s sins are unintentional. 
He believed that proairesis dictates that man is conscious of an act; it is deliberate, otherwise 
there would not exist free will. Individual actions are therefore the domain of the actor, and 
beget other events, whether good or bad (Magna Moralia, 1187b11). Virtue is an exis (habit) 
which is freely chosen by the individual (Nicomachean Ethics 2, 1107a). Aristotle does not 
believe that man has the capacity to dictate fate, and therefore cannot produce Good or 
Evil, Just or Unjust activity (Magna Moralia, 1187a7-8). Moreover, he contradicts Socrates’ 
argument that, given the choice, no one would deliberately desire to be unjust (Magna Moralia, 
1187a9-14. Ιt becomes clear that those who are evil are not of their own free will and those 
who are good are not of their own free will. In other words, nature makes man good and 
ignorance makes him bad. The human will is annulled by natural necessity and, therefore, we 
should not blame those who do not decide voluntarily. As Ricot put it, such a perception 
would invalidate the meaning of punishment, since imprisonment would make no sense, as 
it would turn criminal offense into negligence; see Jacques Ricot, Peut-on tout pardonner? 
(Nantes: Pleins Feux, 1999), 12-18.
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term syneidesis with the synonym terms: reason, knowledge,69 perception, 
theory, mind,70 intellect, prudent life, awareness,71 prudence,72 and practical 
wisdom. According to the Stageirian philosopher the meaning of moral 
conscience is related to moral virtue and legal philosophy. In the Nicomachean 
Ethics he presents the concepts of theory, proairesis, i.e. freedom of will, 
which are inseparably linked with moral conscience. Moral conscience is inner 
speech, the management of the passions by the soul,73 dianoetic virtue and 
common law which is connected, according to the Stageirian philosopher, 
with knowledge and habit. In this way moral conscience brings about a 
firm distinction between good and non-good action and permanent habit. 
Aristotle – and this is where his originality lies – sets knowledge and habit 
completely apart from moral action. The purpose of Aristotelian ethics is 
bliss. Practical wisdom, prudence, reason and intellect are associated with 
moral conscience. Aristotelian morality stresses the positive manifestation 
of the human soul;74 moral conscience is required and connected with the 
performance of either moral action – however not with innaction – or non-
good action. According to Aristotle’s ethics a moral person takes a position 
and, as Ingemar Düring stresses, uses the right measure75 as a criterion for his 
actions for the accomplishment of philosophical cohabitation.76 But when? 
When he is aware and therefore, he makes choices voluntarily.77 It is only then 
that his free will is governed by morality,78 which is why Aristotle promotes 
the concept of consistency.
Aristotle relates moral conscience with free will. Nevertheless, the 
causes of moral determinism area) Aristotelian entelechy, which promotes the 
predetermined purpose and rejects moral freedom and man’s proairesis as the 
causes of his self-determination; b) the Aristotelian akrasia,79 which states the 
weakness of will, namely to not do good while knowing good and to not refuse 
evil. 
69 Aristotle, De anima, 410b3. 
70 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1143a9, 16. Cf. William David Ross, Aristotle (London, and 
New York: Routledge, 1995), 207-211, 229-233. 
71 Aristotle, Great Ethics, 1192a26.
72 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1143a.
73 Aristotle, De anima, 411a24-b17. 
74 René Gauthier, La morale d’Aristote (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1962), 88-98.
75 Ingemar Düring, Aristotele, trans. Pierluigi Donini (Milan: Murcia, 1976), 167-169, 289-292.
76 Ibid., 490-568.
77 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1109b.
78 Aristotle, Politics, 1281a11-1284b34; Plato, Statesman, 284 b-c.
79 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1102b, and Ethics Eudemia, 1224a.
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VΙ. The meaning of moral conscience according to Stoic philosophy
The Hellenistic period80 is a transition point of social, religious and 
philosophical transformation.81 The Stoics, in a climate of socio-political 
terror-mongering, reintroduce a morality which descends from a revival of 
ourselves and from the rationalisation of our moral conscience.82 But what is 
moral conscience? Conscience83 is a term introduced by Stoics; it represented 
the opinion to be shaped upon morality, inherent in one’s actions, and the 
ability to distinguish between good and evil. In Stoic philosophy,84 especially 
in Cicero,85 moral conscience is an inherent, innate and connective principle, 
raising the common natural law, which is also innate in man. The awakening 
of moral conscience is optional and becomes obligatory only with the spark 
of reason. According to Seneca,86 the term conscience means the knowledge 
of beings or otherwise stated the knowledge of the motivation of our actions, 
as well as the knowledge of ourselves.87 The Stoa accepts the existence of 
moral conscience asana biter, mediator or as an evaluating distributor of the 
good and evil motivation of actions. In addition, it separates conscience, as 
well as action, into good and evil, therefore moral action, which follows 
moral conscience, does not fall into fatalism or destiny, but is a product of 
free will. 
The stoic meaning of moral conscience is governed by a moral 
determinism88 and is based on the pantheistic, moral and natural system of 
80 Julia Annas, Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind (Berkeley: University of Berkeley Press, 1992); 
E. P. Arthur, “The Stoic Analysis of the Mind’s Reactions to Presentations,” Hermes 3 (1983): 
69-78; Benson Mates, Stoic Logic (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961), 67-98; cf. 
John Michael Rist, Stoic Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 256-272. 
Anthony A. Long, Stoic Studies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 190-205.
81 Anthony A. Long, Hellenistic Philosophy: Stoics, Epicureans, Sceptics (New York: Charles 
Sribner’s Sons, 1974), 2-3.
82 Cf. Mika Ojakangas, “Arendt, Socrates, and the Ethics of Conscience,” COLLeGIUM: Studies 
Across Disciplines in the Humanities and Social Sciences 8 (2010): 67-85.
83 Cf. Johannes Stelzenberger, Syneidesis, Conscientia, Gewissen: Studie zum Bedeutungswandel 
eines moral theologischen Begriffes (Paderborn: F. Schöningh, 1963); Don E. Marietta, 
Introduction to Ancient Philosophy (London, and New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1998).
84 Cf. Richard Reitzenstein, Die hellenistischen Mysterien religionen nach ihren Grundgedanken 
und Wirkungen (Leipzig, and Berlin: Teubner, 1927), 80-105.
85 Cicero, De natura deorum, 2:16. 
86 Seneca, Epistulae morales, 8:1-2.
87 Ibid., 8:3-5.
88 Anthony A. Long, “Freedom and Determinism in the Stoic Theory of Human Action,” in 
Problems in Stoicism, ed. A. A. Long (London: The Athlone Press, 1971), 174-193. 
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the Stoics. According to the Stoics, God, nature,89 and moral law coexist and 
are connected.90 Since God,91 nature and moral law are interlinked: “God 
participates through nature in all terrestrial things,”92 conscience, which is 
of divine origin through the relation of reason with the divine,93 is innate in 
man. Moral conscience is part of the divine, which exists in the world and 
therefore within man and adheres to natural law. So the following question 
is raised: when does moral conscience according to the Stoics distinguish 
correctly between good and evil? This happens when man aims at a life 
according to reason, freed from passion94 and at a life according to nature, in 
which case the ideal type of Stoic philosopher is introduced. Who is the Stoic 
philosopher according to the Stoics? It is he who converts biological time95 
to psychological,96 does not submit to the causality of chance,97 sets aside 
the servitude of providence and abandons the material predetermination 
of fate98 and destiny. In addition, he is not assimilated with the irrational 
omnipotence of passions,99 the occurrence of which generates the unending 
desire of repeating their fulfilment.100
The Stoics base right morality101 on living in accordance with nature, 
which is defined as the rational art of living and which does not contravene 
natural laws.102 Man himself through the practices of his life becomes a moral 
being. When his actions have reason as a rule, man is governed by harmony 
89 Seneca, Epistulae morales, 120:4.
90 Eleni Kalokairinou, “The Cosmological Assumptions of Stoic Ethics,” Diotima 24 (1996):139-
143. 
91 Seneca, Epistulae morales, 9:1-2.
92 Cicero, De natura deorum, 2:28.
93 Seneca, Epistulae morales, 65:1-2.
94 Hans von Arnim, Stoicorum veterum fragmenta (Leipzig: Teubner, 1903-1924), 1:205 
[henceforth: SVF].
95 Seneca, De brevitatae vitae, 8:1.
96 Seneca, Epistulae morales, 1:3, 49:9.
97 SVF, 1:449.
98 Seneca, Epistulae morales, 12;6-9.
99 Ibid., 60:2-4.
100 SVF , 3: 459.
101 Katerina Ierodiakonou, “The Stoic Division of Philosophy,” Phronesis 38, no. 1 (1993): 
57-74.
102 Luts Bloos, Probleme der Stoischen Physik (Hamburg: Buske Verlag, 1973); cf. Brad Inwood, 
Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism (New York: Clarendon Press, 1985); David E. Hahm, 
The Origins of Stoic Cosmology (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1977); Long, 
Hellenistic Philosophy, 189; Ernst Grumach, Physis und Agathon in der alten Stoa (Berlin: 
Weidmann, 1932). 
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and apathy. It is after all a general admission of Stoa, that happiness of the 
soul103 results from the right distinction of our moral conscience and our 
apathetic self.104 Equally important is the admission placing the bliss of the 
soul,105 which is connected with the performance of the morally right,106 
higher on the evaluative scale against material bliss. The body is subject to 
material bliss, namely the material laws of fate,107 while the immaterial soul 
and spirit motivate man’s life without submitting to causalities.
According to the Stoics, who are advocates of Pantheism, namely of the 
coexistence of the world of man and God, apathy constitutes moral practice, 
which must constitute the conscious choice of moral conscience. Man is his 
moral conscience and is fortunate or unfortunate108 because he freely and 
consciously chooses the way of living he consistently leads.109 Personal 
morality110 according to the Stoics, must result from a rationalised moral 
conscience, which has a universality as the Universal Totality. The prevention 
of moral deviations is not subject to metaphysical designing but constitutes 
mental processing in the process of the distinction between good and evil. This 
is the formative role of moral conscience according to the Stoics: to lift the 
excuse that we cannot set apart good from evil or just from unjust. The stoic 
theory of moral conscience casts deficit and moral deficiency out from moral 
inaction. Man, according to Mates, cannot invoke unawareness and introduce 
moral loose ends and different opinions as a result of his moral dilemmas, for 
moral conscience constitutes the infallible judge of an action.111
The problem of moral conscience according to the Stoics does not have the 
same solution. Marcus Aurelius summarises it under the concept of apathy112 
103 SVF, 3:136; Seneca, Epistulae morales, 8:5, 30:14.
104 Jerry Willmert Stannard, The Psychology of the Passions in the Old Stoa (Illinois: University 
of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1958); Arthur W. H. Adkins, Merit and Responsibility: A Study 
in Greek Values (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960); Roswitha Alpers-Gölz, Der Begriff Skopos 
in der Stoa und seine Vorgeschichte (New York: Olms Hildesheim, 1976), 54-73; Julia Annas, 
Truth and Knowledge, in Doubt and Dogmatism (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1980); Samuel 
Sambursky, Physics of the Stoics (London: Routledge, and Kegan Paul, 1959).
105 Seneca, De vita beata, 2:2.
106 Ibid., 8:1-2.
107 Seneca, Epistulae morales, 14:1-2.
108 SVF, 3:52, 18.
109 SVF, 2:295, 31.
110 Marcus Aurelius, Meditationes, 1:14, 15. Cf. Stannard; Ludwig Stein, Die Psychologie der 
Stoa, vols 1-2 (Berlin: Verlag von S. Calvary, 1939); Gerard Watson, The Stoic Theory of 
Knowledge (Belfast: Queen’s University, 1966).
111 Mates, 65-80.
112 Marcus Aurelius, Meditationes, 8:48.
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that is the rationalised action of the ruling mind, the dominating reason and 
the independence from passions, which create a real shield for man’s freedom 
leading him to the deceiving phenomenality. Due to misguided lifestyle 
choices,113 his lack of peace widens,114 his freedom becomes undermined 
and the negotiating power of his self-sufficiency is weakened. So what is 
the role of moral conscience? As we have mentioned previously the Stoics 
separated conscience, as well as action, into good and evil. The role of bad 
conscience is to weaken reason115 and cause guilt and feelings of terror from 
the erroneous distinction concerning an action. Conversely, good conscience 
brings about undisturbed inner peace, calm, rationalised composure and 
self-confidence. To wit, for Sambursky and Forschner,116 good conscience 
drives man to incline towards living according to nature, while, for Frede and 
Mates, towards living according to reason.117 The deficient supremacy and 
dominance of good conscience over bad, according to More, leads to the 
decline of reason, dangerously jeopardising man’s inner freedom by bringing 
moral subsidence upon him; it also causes severe reduction of man’s inner 
strength, inner discord and deficient self-examination, engraining in him the 
dubious state of confusion, fear, doubt and unsolvable dilemmas.118
Seneca embraces moral conscience119 as the crucial carrier of personal bliss 
and gives it a moral meaning.120 Marcus Aurelius insists that there is a moral 
conscience which generates the self-knowledge of ‘dig within,’121 whereas 
Seneca relates moral conscience with ‘man’s inner bliss.’122
113 Long, Hellenistic Philosophy, 199-208; cf. Arthur, 69-78.
114 Ludwig Edelstein, The Meaning of Stoicism (Ohio: Oberlin College, 1966), 85-94.
115 Seneca, Epistulae morales, 92:27, 37:4.
116 Maximilian Forschner, Die stoische Ethik (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1981), 65-88.
117 Michael Frede, Die stoische Logik (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1974), 24-68.
118 Paul Elmer More, Hellenistic Philosophies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1923), 86-
98; Joseph Moreau, “Ariston et le stoïcisme,” Revue des Έtudes Anciennes 50 (1948): 27-48. 
Especially for the meaning of duty, see Gerhard Nebel, “Der Begriff des Kathekon in der alten 
Stoa,” Hermes 70 (1935): 439-460; Robert Joseph Rabel, Theories of the Emotions in the Old 
Stoa (PhD diss., Michigan University, 1975); Margaret E. Reesor, The Political Theory of the 
Old and the Middle Stoa (New York: J. J. Augustin, 1951). Cf. Marcus Aurelius, Meditationes, 
5:28.
119 Seneca, Epistulae morales,120:1-3, 85:32.
120 Marietta, “Conscience,” 176. Cf. Adolf Dyroff, Die Ethik der alten Stoa (Berlin: Verlag von 
S. Calvary, 1897), 47-69. 
121 Marcus Aurelius, Meditationes, 7:59.
122 Cf. Adolf Bonhoeffer, “Zur stoischen Psychologie,” Philologus 54 (1895), 403-429; Victor 
Brochard, “Sur la logique des Stoiciens,” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 5 (1892): 449-
468; Jacques Brunschwig, ed., Les Stoiciens et leur logique (Paris: Vrin, 1978); Anthony Kenny, 
Will, Freedom and Power (Oxford: Blackwell, 1975); Michael Lapidge, “A Problem in Stoic 
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To sum up, moral conscience, which according to the Stoics has a moral 
meaning, introduces the ideal type of the Stoic philosopher, who is governed by 
the Stoic way of living, which dictates a reassuring handling of life problems. The 
Stoic way of living demands a life animated by an activating moral conscience, 
free of passions, ruled by reason and governed by universality and altruistic 
virtue.123 The Stoic philosopher abandons material life and corporatist logic, 
restores the unity of his inner reason with the divine and natural reason124 and 
in that way he changes into blissful. The Stoic philosopher is not governed by 
communicational man oeuvres, does not evoke negative circumstances in his 
moral action, but simply reactivates his inner reason, restructures his morality 
in each circumstance, is not discouraged by the misfortunes of his life and 
has moral supervision of himself, having his reason – with whom he converses 
continuously – as his guide and starting point. The comparative advantage of 
the Stoic theory of moral conscience, concerns its reference to some inner 
agreement man has to make with himself. It does not concern an external 
agreement with foreign factors, but a repatriation to his inner self. The dynamic 
of the Stoic theory is flexible, it does not impede freedom of will nor does it 
function in a contradictory manner; also, it does not harm, but offers shielding 
from the moral dangers of the submission to dogmatism, oppressive practices 
and obsessions. Stoic philosophy does not create communicational man 
oeuvres and is not a nun solvable mystery. It does not feed the subjugation to 
dated ethics, or bind anyone, or envisage utopias and refuse deviations; it is a 
surplus value which is not given, but only acquired. 
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